Contents List of Tables List of Figures Preface 1 Introduction 1.1 The rôle of microeconomic principles 1.2 Microeconomic models 1.2.1 Purpose 1.2.2 The economic actors 1.2.3 Motivation 1.2.4 The economic environment 1.2.5 Assumptions and axioms 1.2.6 Testinga model 1.3 Equilibrium analysis 1.3.1 Equilibrium and economic context 1.3.2 The comparative statics method 1.3.3 Dynamics and stability 1.4 Background to this book 1.4.1 Economics 1.4.2 Mathematics 1.5 Using the book 1.5.1 A route map 1.5.2 Some tips 2 The Firm 2.1 Basic setting 2.1.1 The rm: basic ingredients 2.1.2 Properties of the production function 2.2 The optimisation problem 2.2.1 Optimisation stage 1: cost minimisation 2.2.2 The cost function 2.2.3 Optimisation stage 2: choosing output 2.2.4 Assembling the solution 2.3 The rm as a black box 2.3.1 Demand and supply functions of the rm 2.3.2 Comparative statics: the general case 2.4 The short run 2.5 The multiproduct rm 2.6 Summary 2.7 Reading notes 2.8 Exercises 3 The Firm and the Market 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The market supply curve 3.3 Large numbers and the supply curve 3.4 Interaction amongst rms 3.5 The size of the industry 3.6 Price-setting 3.6.1 Simple monopoly 3.6.2 Discriminating monopolist 3.6.3 Entry fee 3.7 Product variety 3.8 Summary 3.9 Reading notes 3.10 Exercises 4 The Consumer 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The consumers environment 4.3 Revealed preference 4.4 Preferences: axiomatic approach 4.5 Consumer optimisation: xed income 4.5.1 Cost-minimisation 4.5.2 Utility-maximisation 4.6 Welfare 4.6.1 An application: price indices 4.7 Summary 4.8 Reading notes 4.9 Exercises 5 The Consumer and the Market 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The market and incomes 5.3 Supply by households 5.3.1 Labour supply 5.3.2 Savings 5.4 Household production 5.5 Aggregation over goods 5.6 Aggregation of consumers 5.7 Summary 5.8 Reading notes 5.9 Exercises 6 A Simple Economy 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Another look at production 6.2.1 Processes and net outputs 6.2.2 The technology 6.2.3 The production function again 6.2.4 Externalities and aggregation 6.3 The Robinson Crusoe economy 6.4 Decentralisation and trade 6.5 Summary 6.6 Reading notes 6.7 Exercises 7 General Equilibrium 7.1 Introduction 7.2 A more interesting economy 7.2.1 Allocations 7.2.2 Incomes 7.2.3 An illustration: the exchange economy 7.3 The logic of price-taking 7.3.1 The core of the exchange economy 7.3.2 Competitive equilibrium and the core: small economy 7.3.3 Competitive equilibrium and the core: large economy 7.4 The excess-demand approach 7.4.1 Properties of the excess demand function 7.4.2 Existence 7.4.3 Uniqueness 7.4.4 Stability 7.5 The rôle of prices 7.5.1 The equilibrium allocation 7.5.2 Decentralisation again 7.6 Summary 7.7 Reading notes 7.8 Exercises 8.2 Consumption and uncertainty 8.2.1 The nature of choice 8.2.2 State-space diagram 8.3 A model of preferences 8.3.1 Key axioms 8.3.2 Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility 8.3.3 The felicityfunction 8.4 Risk aversion 8.4.1 Risk premium 8.4.2 Indices of risk aversion 8.4.3 Special cases 8.5 Lotteries and preferences 8.5.1 The probability space 8.5.2 Axiomatic approach 8.6 Trade 8.6.1 Contingent goods: competitive equilibrium 8.6.2 Financial assets 8.7 Individual optimisation 8.7.1 The attainable set 8.7.2 Components of the optimum 8.7.3 The portfolio problem 8.7.4 Insurance 8.8 Summary 8.9 Reading notes 8.10 Exercises 9 Welfare 227 9.1 Introduction 9.2 The constitution 9.3 Principles for social judgments: e¢ ciency 9.3.1 Private goods and the market 9.3.2 Departures from e¢ ciency 9.3.3 Externalities 9.3.4 Public goods 9.3.5 Uncertainty 9.3.6 Extending the e¢ ciency idea 9.4 Principles for social judgments: equity 9.4.1 Fairness 9.4.2 Concern for inequality 9.5 The social-welfare function 9.5.1 Welfare, national income and expenditure 9.5.2 Inequality and welfare loss 9.6 Summary 9.7 Reading notes 9.8 Exercises 10 Strategic Behaviour 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Games basic concepts 10.2.1 Players, rules and payo¤s 10.2.2 Information and Beliefs 10.2.3 Strategy 10.2.4 Representing a game 10.3 Equilibrium 10.3.1 Multiple equilibria 10.3.2 E¢ ciency 10.3.3 Existence 10.4 Application: duopoly 10.4.1 Competition in quantities 10.4.2 Competition in prices 10.5 Time 10.5.1 Games and subgames 10.5.2 Equilibrium: more on concept and method 10.5.3 Repeated interactions 10.6 Application: market structure 10.6.1 Market leadership 10.6.2 Market entry 10.6.3 Another look at duopoly 10.7 Uncertainty 10.7.1 A basic model 10.7.2 An application: entry again 10.7.3 Mixed strategies again 10.7.4 A dynamicapproach 10.8 Summary 10.9 Reading notes 10.10Exercises 11 Information 327 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Hidden characteristics: adverse selection 11.2.1 Information and monopoly power 11.2.2 One customer type 11.2.3 Multiple types: Full information 11.2.4 Imperfect information 11.2.5 Adverse selection: Competition 11.2.6 Application: Insurance 11.3 Hidden characteristics: Signalling 11.3.1 Costly signals 11.3.2 Costless signals 11.4 Hidden actions 11.4.2 Outline of the problem 11.4.3 A simpli ed model 11.4.4 Principal-and-Agent: a richer model 11.5 Summary 11.6 Reading notes 11.7 Exercises 12 Design 381 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Social choice 12.3 Markets and manipulation 12.3.1 Markets: another look 12.3.2 Simple trading 12.3.3 Manipulation: power and misrepresentation 12.3.4 A design issue? 12.4 Mechanisms 12.4.1 Implementation 12.4.2 Direct mechanisms 12.4.3 The revelation principle 12.5 The design problem 12.6 Design: applications 12.6.1 Auctions 12.6.2 A public project 12.6.3 Contracting again 12.6.4 Taxation 12.7 Summary 12.8 Reading notes 12.9 Exercises 13 Government and the Individual 431 13.1 Introduction 13.2 Market failure? 13.3 Nonconvexities 13.3.1 Large numbers and convexity 13.3.2 Interactions and convexity 13.3.3 The infrastructure problem 13.3.4 Regulation 13.4 Externalities 13.4.1 Production externalities: the e¢ ciency problem 13.4.2 Corrective taxes 13.4.3 Production externalities: Private solutions 13.4.4 Consumption externalities 13.4.5 Externalities: assessment 13.5 Public consumption 13.5.1 Nonrivalness and e¢ ciency conditions 13.5.2 Club goods 13.6 Public goods 13.6.1 The issue 13.6.2 Voluntary provision 13.6.3 Personalised prices? 13.6.4 Public goods: market failure and the design problem 13.6.5 Public goods: alternative mechanisms 13.7 Optimal allocations? 13.7.1 Optimum with lump-sum transfers 13.7.2 Second-best approaches 13.8 Conclusion: Economic Prescriptions 13.9 Reading notes 13.10Exercises Bibliography 473 A Mathematics Background 485 A.1 Introduction A.2 Sets A.2.1 Sets in Rn A.3 Functions A.3.1 Linear and a¢ ne functions A.3.2 Continuity A.3.3 Homogeneous functions A.3.4 Homothetic functions A.4 Di¤erentiation A.4.1 Function of one variable A.4.2 Function of several variables A.4.3 Function-of-a-Function Rule A.4.4 The Jacobian derivative A.4.5 The Taylor expansion A.4.6 Elasticities A.5 Mappings and systems of equations A.5.1 Fixed-point results A.5.2 Implicit functions A.6 Convexity and Concavity A.6.1 Convex sets A.6.2 Hyperplanes. A.6.3 Separation results A.6.4 Convex and concave functions A.6.5 quasiconcave functions A.6.6 The Hessian property A.7 Maximisation A.7.1 The basic technique A.7.2 Constrained maximisation A.7.3 More on constrained maximisation A.7.5 A point on notation A.8 Probability A.8.1 Statistics A.8.2 Bayesrule A.8.3 Probability distributions: examples A.9 Reading notes B Answers to Footnote Questions B.1 Introduction B.2 The rm B.3 The rm and the market B.4 The consumer B.5 The consumer and the market B.6 A simple economy B.7 General equilibrium B.8 Uncertainty and risk B.9 Welfare B.10 Strategic behaviour B.11 Information B.12 Design B.13 Government and individual C Selected Proofs C.1 The rm C.1.1 Marginal cost and the Lagrange multiplier C.1.2 Properties of the cost function (Theorem 2.2) C.1.3 Firms demand and supply functions (Theorem 2.4) C.1.4 Firms demand and supply functions (continued) C.1.5 Properties of pro t function (Theorem 2.7) C.2 The consumer C.2.1 The representation theorem (Theorem 4.1) C.2.2 Existence of ordinary demand functions (Theorem 4.5) C.2.3 Quasiconvexity of the indirect utility function C.3 The consumer and the market C.3.1 Composite commodity (Theorem 5.1): C.3.2 The representative consumer (Theorem 5.2): C.4 A simple economy C.4.1 Decentralisation (Theorem 6.2) C.5 General equilibrium C.5.1 Competitive equilibrium and the core (Theorem 7.1) C.5.2 Existence of competitive equilibrium (Theorem 7.4) C.5.3 Uniqueness of competitive equilibrium (Theorem 7.5) C.5.4 Valuation in general equilibrium (Theorem 7.6) C.6 Uncertainty and risk C.6.1 Risk-taking and wealth (Theorem 8.7) C.7 Welfare C.7.1 Arrows theorem (Theorem 9.1) C.7.2 Blacks theorem (Theorem 9.2) C.7.3 The support theorem (Theorem 9.5) C.7.4 Potential superiority (Theorem 9.10) C.8 Strategic behaviour C.8.1 Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with in nite strategy sets (Theorem 10.2) C.8.2 Existence of Nash equilibrium (Theorem 10.1) C.8.3 The Folk theorem C.9 Design C.9.1 Revenue equivalence (Theorem 12.6) C.9.2 The Clark-Groves mechanism (Theorem 12.7) Index 632