Thạc Sĩ Governance Structures in the Post Asset Restructuring Period: Responses by Boards of Directors and T

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER1. INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW . 10
2.A. Portfolio Restructuring and Its Antecedents 11
2.A.1. The Agency Explanation . 12
2.A.2. The Mimicry Explanation . 15
2.A.3. The Environmental Explanation 16
2.A.4. The Strategy Explanation 17
2.B. Corporate Governance 18
2.B.1. The Institutionalization of Agency Arguments . 18
2.B.2. Defining Good Governance 20
2.C. Governance and Its Impact on Performance 22
2.D. The Board of Directors 24
2.E. The Impact of Ownership Concentration . 28
2.F. Governance and Portfolio Restructuring . 32
2.G. Key Findings in the Governance-Restructuring Literature 34
2.G.1. Blockholder Ownership 35
2.G.2. Equity Held by Outside Board Members 41
2.G.3. Equity Held by Inside Board Members . 44
2.G.4. Proportion of Outsiders on the Board . 45
2.G.5. Board Size 46
2.G.6. Equity Held by the Top Management Team . 47
2.G.7. Turnover on the Board of Directors 49
2.G.8. Outside Directors’ Power 49
2.G.9. Board Diversity . 49
2.G.10. Board Tenure . 50
2.G.11. Institutional Ownership . 51
2.G.12. CEO Duality 51
2.G.13. Summary of the Literature 52
2.H. Potential Sources of Conflicting Findings . 53
2.H.1. Different Operationalizations of Restructuring 53
2.H.2. Survivor Bias 54
2.H.3. Statistical Power . 55
2.H.4. Failure to Differentiate Why Firms Restructure 55
2.H.5. Failure to Investigate Non-Restructuring Firms 57
2.I. The Next Step 58

CHAPTER 3. THEORY DEVELOPMENT 63
3.A. Pressures for Change . 63
3.A.1. Pressures for Governance Changes 65
3.A.2. Examples of Institutionally Legitimated Change . 68
3.A.3. Governance in the Post-Restructuring Period 71
3.B. Specific Changes in Governance Structures 72
3.B.1. Board Composition . 72
3.B.2. Board Leadership Structure 77
3.B.3. Board Linkages . 78
3.B.4. CEO, Top Manager, and Director Stock Ownership . 81
3.C. The Moderating Impact of Governance 84
3.C.1. Evidence of Governance’s Impact on Market Valuations . 86
CHAPTER 4. HYPOTHESES AND METHODS . 89
4.A. Governance in the Post-Restructuring Period – The First Study 89
4.A.1. The Sample 89
4.A.2. The Variables and Hypotheses 93
4.A.3. Testing the Hypotheses 103
4.B. The Moderating Impact of Governance – The Second Study …….… . 105
4.B.1. The Sample 105
4.B.2. The Variables and Hypotheses 105
4.B.3. Testing the Hypotheses 109
4.C. Statistical Power Considerations 109
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 111
5.A. Study 1 Results: Governance in Post-Restructuring Periods 111
5.A.1. Proportion of Outsiders on the Board . 118
5.A.2. CEO Duality 119
5.A.3. Board of Director Ties . 126
5.A.4. CEO Equity Ownership . 127
5.A.5. Top Management Team Equity Ownership 134
5.A.6. Board of Director Equity Ownership . 138
5.B. Study 2 Results: Governance’s Impact on Market Valuation 141
5.B.1. Collective Findings 142
5.B.2. Post Hoc Analyses and Results 152
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION, CONTRIBUTIONS, IMPLICATIONS,
LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 162
6.A. Discussion . 162
6.A.1. Discussion – Study 1 .162
6.A.2. Discussion – Study 2 .170
6.B. Reasons for Mixed Results 173
6.B.1. Any Change is Good News .174
6.B.2. Substitution Effects . 175
6.B.3. CEO Influence .175
6.B.4. Organizations Vary in Their Ability to Conform . 176
6.B.5. The Impact of Board Interlocks . 177
VITA 217