Altruism and the family firm: Some theory Private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the U.S. economy (Cox, 1987). Private income transfers based on reciprocal altruism usually occur inter vivos (i.e. between living persons). In our modern society, altruism, especially reciprocal altruism, is usually seen in the family context, and involves two generations, parents and their kids. In recent years, more and more economists have researched topics in this area. Moreover, most of them agree that altruism, especially reciprocal altruism, is one of the most important motives for private income transfers. Therefore, reciprocal altruism is interesting in its own right, and has received considerable attention. In this essay, I am going to pose and discuss the following questions: What can be said in general about transfers from one party to the other in the presence of reciprocal altruism? What is (are) the Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) transfer(s) of reciprocal altruism in the general nature? Is (are) the Nash Equilibrium(s) Pareto-optimal? What are the circumstances in which there is no equilibrium? When two people are reciprocally altruistic, do both of them necessarily make positive transfers? If only one makes a positive transfer, what are the factors that determine the amount of the transfer and the person who makes it? How do these factors affect the amount of the transfer and determine the person who does the positive transfer? What can be said about the effect of reciprocal altruism on the work efforts of family members? How does reciprocal altruism affect their equilibrium personal utilities? I begin by addressing these questions when incomes of family members are fixed or earned in an impersonal market. Building on this base, I address the same questions when incomes are generated in a family firm. [TABLE="class: citation"] [TR] [TH]Format:[/TH] [TD]Dissertation[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TH]Author(s):[/TH] [TD]Wu, Zhenyu[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TH]Published:[/TH] [TD]2001[/TD] [/TR] [TR] [TH]Language:[/TH] [TD]English[/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE]